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Abstract
The rapid growth of grid-connected embedded generation is changing the
operational characteristics of power distribution networks. Amongst a range
of issues being reported in the research, the effect of these changes on so-called
‘traditional protection systems’ has not gone without attention. Looking to
the future, the possibility of microgrid systems and deliberate islanding of
sections of the network will require highly flexible distribution management
systems and a re-design of protection strategies.
This paper explores the envisaged protection issues concerned with large
penetrations of embedded generation in distribution networks extending into
auto-reclosure and protection device coordination. A critical review of re-
cently reported protection strategies for grid-connected only and microgrid
operation is also undertaken. The outcome is a list of recommendations to
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achieve microgrid protection adequacy in future networks.
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smart grid
1. Introduction
The increasing pressure for renewable or ‘green’ energy coupled with gov-
ernment funded economic incentives has caused a paradigm shift in the way
residential, commercial and governmental bodies approach energy invest-
ment. The shift has predominantly manifested through the dramatic increase
in the presence of grid-connected embedded generation (EG) in distribution
networks (DNs).
DNs were designed under the premise of radial power flow [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
The introduction of small-scale EG introduces the possibility of bi-directional
power flow, rendering the network non-radial. The integrity of DN design
philosophy is compromised and a detailed analysis is required to ascertain
the implications of various levels of EG penetration.
For the purposes of this paper, the DN encompasses the electrical infras-
tructure between a zone substation and a customer’s point of connection1
(POC).
Reviews of proposed protection schemes in microgrids have been con-
ducted by Mirsaeidi et al. in [6] and Gopalan et al. in [7]. Both offer excel-
lent synopses of microgrid protection schemes. The purpose of this paper is
to expand upon the range of investigated microgrid protection schemes and
proffer a more in-depth explanation and analysis of each proposed protection
scheme. Furthermore, this paper provides supplementary recommendations
1IEC definition: the reference point on the electric power system where the users’
electrical facility is connected
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for a more holistic approach towards microgrid protection design philosophy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II discusses
the possible issues concerning the continued proliferation of EG in DNs.
The discussion extends to recloser, fuse, sectionaliser and EG coordination
in contemporary DNs. Section III reviews proposed protection strategies by
various authors for DNs employing grid-connected only operation. Section IV
provides a critical analysis of microgrid protection strategies encompassing
both grid-connected and autonomous modes of operation. Finally, Section
V outlines the preferred protection schemes to be adopted should a modular
microgrid become a reality. A summary of the analysed protection schemes
is given in the appendix.
2. Contemporary DN Protection Systems
2.1. Over Current and Earth Fault protection
Traditional protective devices in DNs consist of reclosers, sectionalisers
and fuses. All reclosers interrupt fault current using a circuit breaker (CB).
To coordinate protective devices, traditional DN protection schemes imple-
ment graded over current (OC) protection and earth fault (EF) protection.
OC and EF protection gradings are achieved using inverse definite minimum
time (IDMT) curves. Each curve incorporates an error margin in order to
account for delays in signal processing, signal transmission and the time for
the circuit breaker to open and extinguish the fault.
A radial network has only one source of fault current. Therefore, any
protective devices located between the fault source and the fault will observe
(almost) the same fault current. IDMT curves must be arranged carefully
to ensure that the minimum number of customers are disconnected when a
fault is isolated. The design process of choosing appropriate IDMT curves
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does not incorporate the effects of EG. In fact, the IEEE Standard 1547-2003
states that:
“Any distributed resource installation connected to a spot net-
work shall not cause operation or prevent reclosing of any net-
work protectors installed on the spot network. This coordination
shall be accomplished without requiring any changes to prevail-
ing network protector clearing time practices of the area electric
power system [8].”
Experimentally, OC and EF protection have been shown to be suscepti-
ble to poor discrimination in networks with a high EG penetration [9, 10].
Hence, a threshold of EG penetration must exist that defines the boundary
where a network does not comply with the protective requirements stipu-
lated within the IEEE Standard IEEE1547-2003. The determination of such
a boundary has not been ascertained as there are other limiting factors of EG
connection such as over voltage; empirically, over-voltage instances precede
protection failure. However, there are control mechanisms such as reactive
power absorption and real power curtailment capable of eliminating over-
voltage occurrences [11]. The EG threshold before DN protection failure is
poorly defined and is an area of research that requires further investigation.
Failure of OC and EF protection discrimination can be achieved in two
ways. Firstly, a protection devices can trip unnecessarily for a fault outside
of that protection device’s zone of protection. Secondly, a protection device
can fail to trip when a fault occurs within that protection device’s zone of
protection. These protection failures are referred to as a nuisance trip and
fail-to-trip respectively. Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 1. The star
designates a fault which is located in CB2’s zone of protection. Fault current
4
will flow through all circuit breakers; however, CB1 and CB3 will experience
a fault current in the opposite direction to normal power flow. OC and EF
devices are not equipped with directional elements in DNs; hence, the trip







Figure 1: Protection Discrimination Example
The IDMT curves of CB1 and CB2 are not graded in the protection
planning process due to the assumption of radial power flow – no fault current
will flow through CB1 during a fault in CB2’s zone of protection if the DN is
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radial. While it is unlikely that CB1 would trip before CB2 isolates the fault,
a CB1 nuisance trip may occur if the pick-up current of CB1 is significantly
lower than CB2. The result would be the unnecessary loss of all customers on
the CB1’s corresponding feeder. Customers will likely be reconnected after
an auto-reclosure once CB2 isolates the fault. However, the reliability of the
overall network is compromised.
Similarly, CB3 would observe fault current in the opposite direction of
radial power flow during the fault in CB’s zone of protection. In the unlikely
event that the reverse fault current is sufficient to trip CB3, no extra cus-
tomers are lost. A trip at CB2 isolates all customers downstream of CB2
which includes all customers downstream of CB3. All islanded EG units
will isolate themselves via anti-islanding protection and reclosure attempts
of CB2 and CB3 will ensure that the final operational state of each circuit
breaker is identical to an equivalent situation with no EG connection. How-
ever, the operation of CB3 violates the IEEE Standard 1547-2003 [8].
The fault current provided by EG2 will increase the voltage drop between
EG2 and the fault, reducing the fault current passing through CB2. Dur-
ing a high impedance end of zone fault, the presence of EG may cause the
fault current flowing through a protection device to be below the pick-up
current. In such a case, a fail-to-trip would occur, increasing the likelihood
of bushfires as well as electrocution risk to customers and utility personnel.
Fault discrimination problems caused by high penetrations of EG can pose
a significant threat to DN reliability and safety.
Contrary to discrimination, protection selectivity between reclosers can
be improved through EG connection. Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 2.
CB2 and CB3 are graded to ensure that CB3 will operate before CB2 for a






Figure 2: Protection Selectivity Example
CB2 and CB3, the current observed by CB3 is greater than CB2. Hence,
the time difference between a CB3 trip and a CB2 trip will be greater than
the graded IDMT curves would suggest. Hence, the selectivity of an OC/EF
protection scheme can be improved through EG connection. However, there
are further complications that must be considered concerning auto-reclosure.
2.2. Recloser-EG Coordination
Reclosers will typically trip before an EG unit’s anti-islanding protection
will detect loss of mains (LOM). The maximum allowable time it should take
for passive anti-islanding protection to operate is two seconds according to
Australian Standard 4777.3 and IEEE Standard 1547 [12, 8]. Reclosers will
often remain open in the range of hundreds of milliseconds up to seconds,
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before a reclosure attempt [13]. The time that a recloser remains open before
a reclosure attempt is referred to as the recloser dead time. After the forma-
tion of an island, it is likely that a phase difference of the voltage waveforms
across the open recloser will occur. Thus, an out-of-phase reclosure would
create a large disturbance in the network, possibly damaging network infras-
tructure and EG technology. IEEE 1547-2003 states that an EG must cease
to energise a network prior to a reclosure by the DN protection system [8].
Hence, it is important to consider the impact of EG anti-islanding operation
when selecting reclosure times.
Further, it is possible for an EG unit to sustain an arc even after a recloser
has isolated the fault from the main supply [13]. The purpose of the recloser
dead time is to allow the arc path to de-ionise, thus removing the fault,
assuming the fault is temporary. If the arc is sustained by EG, a temporary
fault may become permanent, reducing the reliability of the network.
A trade-off is necessary when coordinating reclosers with EG units. The
recloser must be open for long enough to ensure that anti-islanding protection
can operate, but short enough such so that the interruption experienced by
customers is minimised. The coordination is further complicated when fuses
and sectionalisers are installed within the DN.
2.3. Recloser-Fuse-EG Coordination
Reclosers are essential to maintain high reliability levels as most faults
on DNs are temporary [5]. Spurs, off the backbone of a feeder, are normally
protected by a fuse. Whenever a fuse isolates a fault by burning out, that fuse
has to be replaced by utility personnel before supply is regained to customers
downstream of the blown fuse. In order to further increase the reliability of
DNs, reclosers are coordinated with fuses such that the recloser will isolate
before the fuse will blow on the first detection of a fault. If the fault is
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temporary, the fault will usually be cleared before the first reclose and no
more protection operations will be necessary. If the fault is still present, the
fault is considered permanent; the fuse will blow faster than the recloser trip
time. Hence, two separate IDMT curves are used for reclosers which are
coordinated with fuses: a fast IDMT curve that will trip the recloser before
the fuse blows and a slow IDMT curve that will allow the fuse to burn out if
the fault is still present (and downstream of that fuse). The inclusion of EG
in DNs increases the likelihood of a fuse blowing out on a temporary fault
before the recloser with a fast IDMT curve trips [2, 14].
In contemporary DNs, EG penetration levels are low and do not provide
sufficient fault current to interfere with protection grading nor selectivity.
However, as EG penetration rises, the aggregate fault current supplied by
EG units may cause fuses to blow unnecessarily. Fig. 3 shows an example
DN where a fuse has been coordinated with an upstream recloser programmed
with both a fast and slow IMDT curve. The additional fault current supplied
by the local EG implies that the fault current measured by the recloser is
smaller than the fault current flowing through the fuse. If the difference in
fault current is significant enough, the fuse may blow before the fast IDMT
curve programmed within the recloser will send a trip signal. The overall
reliability of the network will be significantly reduced as most faults within
DNs are temporary in nature [5].
2.4. Recloser-Sectionaliser-EG Coordination
Sectionalisers are incapable of extinguishing the fault current levels asso-
ciated with that sectionaliser’s zone of protection. Hence, sectionalisers are
only useful when coordinated with reclosers. Sectionalisers will open after
a set number of identified reclosures and when the fault current has been







Figure 3: Effects of EG on Recloser-Fuse Coordination
trips after the first reclosure and after then fault has been extinguished for
a second time.
However, if the fault current is sustained by the local EG, the current
rating of the sectionaliser may be exceeded. Either the sectionaliser would
be damaged upon trying to open with a sustained fault current or the sec-
tionaliser may fail to detect an upstream CB operation. In either case, the
overall reliability of the DN would be compromised.
2.5. Anti-Islanding Protection
Anti-islanding protection is responsible for preventing instances of unin-
tentional islanding in DNs. Unintentional islanding is any situation where











Sectionaliser opens after two counts
Trip time
RecloseTrip Trip
Figure 4: Sectionaliser Operation [15]
the mains supply. There are significant technical and safety issues that might
arise from an islanding situation. Consequently, intentional islanding is for-
bidden by the Australian Standard AS4777.3 [12]. Anti-islanding protection
can be broadly classified into three different types: passive, active and com-
munications based. In contemporary applications, anti-islanding protection
is limited to passive and active types.
According to comprehensive reports on anti-islanding technology, there
is no form of non-communications or utility based anti-islanding protection
without a non-detection zone (NDZ) [16, 17]. In practice, however, the risks
of most NDZs being realised are very small. However, as EG penetration
rises, the risk of anti-islanding protection failure increases. Anti-islanding
protection failure can lead to out-of-phase reclosure, decreased reliability
and risk of electrocution to utility personnel.
Anti-islanding protection design is not a focus within this paper. A
plethora of different anti-islanding methods have been proposed and assessed
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[16, 17]. The operational characteristics of an island that are required to
prevent islanding detection within two seconds cannot be achieved with con-
temporary EG penetration sizes and limitations stipulated by utilities [18].
However, if EG restrictions are lifted and EG penetration levels can approach
100% within DNs, the likelihood of anti-islanding protection failure to detect
LOM increases significantly. In such a case, traditional DN line protection
would be completely inadequate. A significant protection design philosophy
reform would be necessary, including the protection of EG units.
When EG penetration levels exceed 100% of DN capacity, a logical evo-
lution of DN operation is the microgrid concept. Within a microgrid, anti-
islanding protection is unnecessary, yet the detection of LOM is still vital
such that the control and protection schemes employed by an EG unit can
change as required. For instance, the control scheme of EG units may change
from constant-power control to droop control to ensure proper load following
as the microgrid transitions into autonomous mode. It is important to recog-
nise that the protection techniques implemented in microgrids are also valid
for grid-connected only operation as a microgrid must be capable of isolat-
ing a fault during both grid-connected and autonomous modes of operation.
Conversely, grid-connected only protection techniques can be implemented
in a microgrid during grid-connected operation.
3. Proposed Protection Schemes for DNs with Grid-Connected EG
The introduction of EG in DNs subverts the premise of radiality central
to traditional DN protection philosophy. The non-radiality of DNs can be
likened to the power flow observed in transmission networks. The protection
philosophy for transmission networks implements distance and directional
protective elements to detect and locate faults despite the presence multiple
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fault current sources. However, the energy resources connected to transmis-
sion networks are typically large-scale synchronous machines that are capable
of delivering large fault currents. Hence, the principles used in transmission
networks could in theory be utilised in DNs with a high EG penetration if EG
units were interfaced through synchronous machines and the extra expense
of directional and/or distance protection can be justified.
The implementation of directional OC relays is proposed by Bhalja et al.
in [19]. All EG units midway through a line have two separate protection
devices with directional elements connected on each side of that EG unit’s
POC. All other DN protective devices are non-directional. There are many
concerns with such a protection scheme. There is a significant extra cost as
two current transformers, two relays and two circuit breakers are necessary
for each EG unit connected midway through a feeder. The scheme also
assumes that EG units are interfaced through synchronous machines which
is often not the case. Inverter-interfaced EG units would likely be unable to
provide enough fault current for adequate protection discrimination during
to the limited thermal inertia of power electronics switches. Finally, non-
directional relays connected at the upstream end each feeder could trip due
to EG feeding faults on adjacent feeders. Hence, it may be appropriate for
all OC protective devices to be equipped with directional elements with an
EG unit downstream of that protective device.
An adaptive protection scheme that incorporates protection against volt-
age sag is proposed by Choi et al. in [20]. In the paper, a single end-of-line
synchronous generator is the adopted EG interface in the case study. The
proposed protection scheme includes both OC and voltage-based methods of
fault detection. Protection thresholds of ‘critical current’ and ‘critical volt-
age’ are proposed and can be defined as the expected fault current and voltage
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at an EG unit’s POC during a zero-impedance fault at the nearest upstream
protection device. These ‘critical values’ are thresholds used to determine if
a fault is within the inter-tie circuit breaker’s zone of protection. An instan-
taneous trip is implemented for any fault current above the critical current,
otherwise IDMT curves are implemented if the measured current at the EG
unit is above the pre-determined pick-up current. The proposed protection
scheme also uses IDMT curves to determine whether the recorded voltage
magnitude is indicative of a fault and, upon detection, will trip the inter-tie
circuit breaker. The protection scheme proposed [20] may be inappropriate
for schemes with inverter-interfaced EG, particularly during high-impedance
faults as fault current flow would be minimal. Furthermore, many Australian
DNs cover large distances and substantial voltage drops are frequent. Hence,
EG protection using voltage magnitude at the EG unit’s POC will likely
encounter discrimination issues. Complications for detecting phase-to-earth
faults would also arise as the earthing connection and transformer connection
can prevent the flow of zero sequence fault current from EG units. There are
also unanswered questions regarding the coordination of multiple EG units.
An alternative to OC protection in DNs using distance protection is pro-
posed by Chilvers et al. in [21]. Distance protection is directional in nature
and hence is appropriate for non-radial networks. A disadvantage of using
distance protection is the connection of a voltage transformer which rep-
resents a significant extra cost compared with traditional OC protection.
However, it can be argued that the voltage transformer is unnecessary as
the voltage sensor can be connected on the low voltage side of the distribu-
tion transformer. Contemporary DNs are often separated by normally-open
switches or reclosers which can be used to reroute supply during mainte-
nance. In theory, normally-open points could be closed and the network
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could be protected using distance protection in much the same way as trans-
mission networks are protected [22]. The non-radiality of a DN would in-
crease the reliability of that DN if protection selectivity and discrimination
can be achieved. In addition to protection considerations, the voltage profile
and thermal loading of the line must also be considered before a normally-
open point should be closed. Distance protection also has the advantage of a
faster operation time which is important for the overall stability of the DN. A
significant complication arises due to delta-wye connected distribution trans-
formers incapable of passing zero sequence current. For a fault on the high
voltage side of the distribution transformer, there will be no zero sequence
voltage on the low voltage side of the transformer. The protection scheme at-
tempts to compensate for the lack of measurable zero-sequence voltage data
using a preset estimate of the impedance behind the distance relay during
phase-to-earth faults, including the impedance of the earth return path. The
determination of protection settings for distance protection may be a more
rigorous process than traditional OC protection to prevent fault under-reach
or over-reach during phase-to-earth faults. While preliminary research is
promising, more research is necessary to assess the efficaciousness of distance
protection in DNs with a high EG penetration.
4. Proposed Protection Schemes for Microgrid Applications
An effective, robust and experimentally verified protection design philos-
ophy for intentional islanding has not yet been developed. Many protection
schemes have been proffered by a variety of authors. Arguably, protection
is the least understood topic within the realm of microgrid design philos-
ophy largely due to the unusual fault response of inverter interfaced EG.
Traditional OC protection alone has been proven to be insufficient for micro-
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grids containing inverter-interfaced generators [23]. Coordinating protection
devices across both grid-connected and autonomous modes of operation to
maintain adequate redundancy, discrimination and selectivity is a key focus
in contemporary protection research.
The simplest method of maintaining a significant fault current during
islanded operation is through connection of machines with a significant in-
herent inertia. The authors of [24] propose the inclusion of a flywheel system
to complement inverter-interfaced EG in order to supply a significant cur-
rent when a fault occurs in an islanded microgrid. Flywheel systems are very
useful in applications containing critical load, especially when coupled with
dispatchable power such as diesel generators [25]. However, flywheels are
expensive and require a sophisticated control scheme for coordination with
EG in a microgrid. Due to the high cost of such a scheme, it is unlikely that
every inverter-interfaced EG unit will be equipped with a flywheel system.
Thus, it is envisaged that a communications medium would be necessary to
instigate an inter trip to isolate all non-inertial EG when a relay located at
an inertial EG unit detects a fault. There is also no consideration for back
up protection for cases of communications or flywheel failure.
Three protection design schemes for microgrids are proffered by Conti
et al. [26]. Each scheme assumes the presence of a microgrid central con-
troller and thus communications, which is a subversion of the desirable and
well established plug-and-play microgrid design philosophy [27, 28, 29]. Each
scheme also employs OC protection and hence cannot be considered appro-
priate for inverter-interfaced EG.
The first scheme proposed in [26] uses conventional OC protection to
isolate the fault at the protection device at the ‘satellite centre’ (SC) (the
circuit breaker immediately downstream of SC in Fig. 5) of the microgrid.
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Before the circuit breaker at the SC trips, each protective device determines
the direction of the fault. In the example of a phase-to-earth fault, the zero
sequence current direction is determined using the zero sequence voltage as a
reference. A lagging zero sequence current indicates a forward direction fault
and vice versa. The central controller then determines the location of the
fault using the information gathered by each relay transmitted over a commu-
nications channel and switches, in and out, the appropriate circuit breakers
to ensure fault isolation and maximum customer connection. The central
controller must be given a data set containing the network topology and pro-
tective device locations and identifiers. Any modification of the microgrid
requires significant alterations and reprogramming of the protection devices.
There is also a significant loss of reliability due to unnecessary tripping of
upstream protective devices and the abandonment of recloser operation. Re-
closers are essential to maintaining reliability in DNs (though reclosers can
be problematic if EG isolation does not occur before the first reclose). It is
important to note that for the first proposed scheme, the isolation of a fault
is not dependent on communications; merely the appropriate selectivity of
the protection is dependent on communications.
The second scheme uses OC and zero sequence current relays to determine
the presence and direction of a fault to identify the fault location, much
like the first proposed scheme. The difference is that the circuit breaker
immediately downstream of the SC no longer necessarily trips first. Upon
detecting a fault, each protection device communicates with any adjacent
protection devices through a pilot wire. If the OC or zero sequence current
direction is the same, no protection trip is necessary. If the directions are
different, the relevant circuit breakers will isolate the fault. The advantage
of the second proposed scheme is the short duration trip time, reducing the
17
CB1 CB2 CB3
Load 1 Load 2 Load 3
Figure 5: Conti’s Microgrid Example
impact of fault current on existing infrastructure and minimising the risk of
igniting a bushfire. The disadvantage of the second proposed scheme is the
extra cost of the pilot wire and control logic as well as the lack of contingent
protection if communications are to fail. The absence of communication
response and presence of OC would necessitate a trip signal which would
compromise the selectivity and reliability of the protection scheme.
The final scheme contains two sets of CTs, circuit breakers and relays
adjacent to every load and EG unit, except at the end of the line where
only one set is necessary. Each protective device is directional in nature and
‘looks’ away from that protective device’s load or EG unit as shown in Fig. 6.
When a fault current is detected, the protective devices at the end of each
line segment compare the direction of the fault. If the paired protection de-
vices observe the same forward fault direction, those protection devices will
both trip, isolating the fault. A communications medium is required for the
protections scheme to operate as expected; hence, a back-up protection is
necessary in the case of communication failure. The extra protection infras-
tructure represents a significant cost and could only be deemed appropriate
18
Load 1 Load 2
CB1a CB1b CB2a CB2b
Load 3
CB3a CB3b
Figure 6: Conti’s Final Protection Scheme Example
for large scale EG such as those found in sub-transmission networks.
All three protection schemes rely on the presence of OC during fault
response; a premise which is unreasonable in the case of microgrids dominated
by inverter interfaced EG. Conti discusses the protection issues concerned
with inverter-interfaced EG and recommends use of differential protection
which also requires use of a communications medium. The reliance on a
communications medium for adequate protection compromises the reliability
of the microgrid. It is also preferable for the microgrid to operate in a plug-
and-play manner as much as possible to reduce DN planning complexity and
eliminating the need for reconfiguration of protection settings each time a
modification is made to the DN.
A microgrid protection scheme for inverter-interfaced EG dominated net-
works is proposed by Loix et al. in [30]. The use of inverter-interfaced EG can
have significant benefits from a stability perspective provided the inverter is
rated sufficiently to provide adequate fault ride-through. An inverter inter-
face decouples the dynamics of an energy source or machine from the grid [31];
the inverter can be controlled to provide a desirable response to disturbances
19
given that the ratings of the IGBTs are not exceeded and enough short term
energy is available from the DC bus. For the protection scheme proposed in
[30], a fault current limiter is necessary to ensure an inverter-interfaced EG
will aid in fault detection without exceeding current ratings. The proposed
protection scheme uses sequence components to identify the fault location
and uses time delays to achieve protection coordination. Communications
may be used to reduce the trip time, but is not essential to achieve protec-
tion adequacy. The major omission of the proposed scheme is a discussion
regarding protection discrimination capabilities, particularly during the pres-
ence of high impedance faults. The zero sequence fault current may not be
significantly different from an unbalanced load current. Furthermore, trans-
former connections and earthing configurations are not taken into account
may provide multiple (or no) zero sequence current paths.
The authors in [32] use directional OC, negative sequence current and
zero sequence current protection to detect faults within a microgrid. For
high impedance faults, an energy level based protection proposed by [33]
is adopted. However, there exist some loads that behave similarly to high
impedance faults [33]; hence, discrimination problems may arise. The pro-
posed control scheme includes the provision of blocking signals between pro-
tective elements to preclude false trips due to faults in adjacent zones of
protection. There are several advantages to using blocking signals to ensure
selectivity and redundancy in DNs. Firstly, the use of blocking signals pro-
vides back-up protection for circuit breaker failure. Blocking signals will only
be transmitted long enough for the fault to be isolated according to the IDMT
curve programmed within each relay. If a circuit breaker has failed to isolate
the fault, the blocking signal will be removed and the adjacent circuit breaker
will trip, providing adequate back-up protection. Secondly, assuming com-
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munications infrastructure is healthy, selectivity can be achieved in tandem
with fast tripping times, improving the stability of the network. Protective
devices no longer have to wait until each upstream device has the opportu-
nity to isolate a fault before tripping. Finally, in the event of communications
failure, the protection scheme will still isolate the fault. The disadvantage
of communications failure is that selectivity will be compromised which will
result in an unnecessary disconnection of supply to some customers. Such a
disadvantage can be considered acceptable within the context of safe micro-
grid operation.
The use of differential protection in microgrids been proposed by Zeineldin
et al. in [34] for microgrid application, similarly to Conti in [26]. To accom-
plish differential protection, the end of each line must be equipped with a
current transformer, relay and circuit breaker. A communications link will
be necessary between devices on the end of each line such that the end of
line currents can be compared. A relay will send a trip signal if the differ-
ence in current exceeds a predetermined level. In the proposed scheme in
[34], each EG unit is assumed to keep contemporary anti-islanding protec-
tion that will inform the central controller and EG unit whether an island
has formed. Constant current control is used for grid-connected operation
and P-V control is used for autonomous control. The proposed protection
scheme offers very effective protection discrimination and selectivity assum-
ing all components are working properly. However, no provision for back up
protection during communications or circuit breaker failure is given. Further-
more, the proposed protection scheme is very expensive and only appropriate
for sub-transmission level microgrids with limited spurs and loads.
Instantaneous communication based differential protection is proposed
as an effective protection scheme for microgrids in [35]. In the event of a
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circuit breaker failure, adjacent relays would receive an inter-trip signal to
isolate a fault. However, provision for communication failure is not given.
The authors in [36] investigate the efficacy of differential protection, but
only consider three-phase bolted faults which are uncommon. Regardless,
differential protection would theoretically provide adequate discrimination
and selectivity for any type of fault given the fault current exceeds 10% of
nominal current flow [35].
The use of voltage-restrained over-current (VROC) relays in inverter dom-
inated microgrids is proposed by Tumilty et al. in [37]. The feasibility of
using solely voltage-based protection techniques for protection adequacy in
a network is explored in the paper. The paper concludes that topological
selectivity is problematic and impractical for complex microgrids. VROC
relays can provide separate OC protection settings depending on the locally
measurable voltage. The use of VROC reduces tripping times and reduces
the risk of nuisance tripping if protection settings are chosen correctly. How-
ever, there still exists complications in coordinating protective devices us-
ing VROC; general selectivity for every microgrid configuration cannot be
achieved without communications.
A sequence component voltage-based protection scheme for islanded op-
eration is proposed in [38] and [39]. The three-phase voltage waveforms are
converted into the direct-quadrature (d-q) axis using a rotating reference
frame. The difference between the reference d-q voltages and the measured
d-q voltages is calculated and analysed to determine the fault type and loca-
tion. The models of EG units given in [38] and [39] assume an outer voltage
regulation loop and an inner current regulation loop to control the gating
signals transmitted to the inverter. Such a control scheme does not allow for
load following and hence is inappropriate for use within microgrids.
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The sequence component voltage-based protection scheme relies on com-
munications infrastructure to provide fault discrimination. The authors of
[36] found that if a significant voltage drop existed during normal operation,
fault discrimination could not be achieved even with healthy communica-
tions. Fault discrimination is further complicated through the prevalence of
very high impedance phase-to-earth faults in DNs, particularly when control
schemes such as droop control maintain the voltage within acceptable bounds
as stipulated in [40]. Hence, voltage-based protection schemes are deemed
inadequate as primary protection within microgrids.
Another protection scheme proposed by Al-Nasseri et al. involves the use
of harmonic content of voltage waveforms in inverter-based EG dominated
microgrids [4]. A protection relay monitors the total harmonic distortion
(THD) of the EG unit’s POC voltage and will trip the local circuit breaker
if the THD exceeds a predetermined threshold and the fault is proven to
be within that protection relay’s zone of protection. A communications link
is used to compare the THD at various EG unit terminals. There are no
considerations for distribution transformer connection which are common in
DNs. A delta-wye connected distribution transformer will have a significant
impact on the fault current and voltage waveform at the EG unit’s POC.
In some cases, protection discrimination through THD may be impossible.
Furthermore, the proposed scheme is inappropriate for high impedance faults
which may only provide a voltage drop similar to significant unbalanced
operation. There might also exist complications caused by dynamic loads
which could cause nuisance tripping [4]. It is noted in [4] that protection
using THD can only be a back-up or complementary form of protection [4].
Li et al. proffer a protection scheme for inverter dominated networks in










Figure 7: Protection using Travelling Waves [41]
termine the location of the fault using a Rogowski sensor [42]. If the first
two wavefronts detected by a protective device have the same polarity, the
fault is located within the relay’s zone of protection as shown in Fig. 7. If
the fault can be located, selectivity is assured and the fault will be isolated
much quicker than traditional protection devices. The shortcoming of us-
ing wavefronts for protection analysis is the ambiguity of the fault inception
angle. If the fault occurs when the voltage is not near peak, the protection
performance will be inadequate. A rate of change of current back-up pro-
tection is proposed; however, the discrimination between fault events and
acceptable disturbances has not been assessed and requires further research
to determine the efficacy of the proposed protection scheme.
Distance protection is proposed for microgrid protection in [43] as the rec-
ommended form of primary protection. Directional OC and EF elements are
used as local back up protection. Distance protection requires measurement
of the local voltage as well as current. The voltage is measured at the LV
winding of the distribution transformer to avoid the need for a voltage trans-
former. It is assumed that a delta-wye connected distribution transformer
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is used. The distance protection relay must incorporate compensation for
the voltage drop across the transformer. Detection of earth faults can be
particularly challenging as the zero sequence voltage cannot be measured di-
rectly due to the connection of the voltage sensor at the LV winding; the zero
sequence voltage has to be estimated using an approximate fault impedance
behind the distance relay and the measured zero sequence current. Similarly
to most proposed protection scheme, distance protection may have discrimi-
nation issues when high impedance single line to earth faults occur. However,
if adequate impedance compensation and protection discrimination can be
achieved, distance protection may be an effective means of microgrid protec-
tion.
A similar approach is adopted by Dewadasa et al. in [44] using an
admittance-based protection scheme for application in inverter dominated
microgrids. Each DN line protective device implements IDMT curves to ex-






Where Ym is the measured admittance of the relay and Yt is the admittance
for a zero impedance fault at the end of the protection zone. The scheme is
shown to work for a three-phase bolted fault when the microgrid is operating
in islanded mode. Further research is needed to identify whether admittance
protection is effective for high impedance phase-to-earth faults.
A differential energy based scheme is proposed by Samantaray et al.
in [45]. An S-transform is used to analyse the current waveform; the S-
transform is a time-frequency transform that is an aggregate wavelet and
short-time Fourier transform. The current is measured and modified using
the S-transform to find the spectral energy content at each protective device.
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The spectral energy is then compared with the data gathered at the other
end of each protection zone to find the differential spectral energy. The pro-
posed protection scheme is inherently communication based and thus requires
some form of back-up protection for instances of communication failure. Case
studies carried out in [45] reveal that differential energy based schemes are
effective for both grid connected and islanded modes of operation for a va-
riety of fault types. Doubly-fed induction generator based wind farms were
implemented within the case study as the EG type. No provisions for en-
ergy storage were made which is impractical for microgrid applications. It is
likely that energy storage would be connected through an inverter interface.
Further research is required to assess whether protection discrimination is
possible for more complicated networks, particularly in the presence of un-
balanced loading and significant inverter-interfaced EG penetration.
A microgrid protection scheme based on symmetrical and differential cur-
rent components is presented by Nikkhajoei and Lasseter in [46]. Nikkhajoei
and Lasseter assume that the microgrid can be separated from the main grid
by means of a static transfer switch. The adopted protection design phi-
losophy states that the static transfer switch shall be opened for any fault
detection within the microgrid. Furthermore, Nikkhajoei and Lasseter as-
sume that microgrid sources are inverter-interfaced and hence limited to 2.0
p.u. of rated current; traditional OC protection is deemed inappropriate for
islanded modes of operation. The plausibility of detecting phase-to-earth






The differential phase current scheme proved effective for phase-to-earth
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faults if earth current passed through a protective relay. All EG units are in-
terfaced with the microgrid through a wye(neutral)-delta transformer which
does not align with Australian DN transformer connections. All loads are
also neutral connected and a single earthing point is connected to the neutral
upstream of the static transfer switch. The earthing and neutral connection
of the proposed microgrid does not allow earth current to flow through a re-
lay downstream of a phase-to-earth fault. Hence, bi-directional fault current
cannot be achieved unless multiple earth points are available throughout the
network. However, a multi-earthed system would introduce the possibility of
nuisance trips and compromise fault discrimination as zero sequence current
would flow from each earthing point during a phase-to-earth fault. Loads are
usually unbalanced in DNs, providing earth current during normal operation
if an earthing path is supplied, further complicating protection discrimina-
tion. A protection scheme based on differential components of phase currents
would also be incapable of detecting line-to-line faults and hence cannot be
implemented as a complete protection system.
In order to better identify the presence of phase-to-earth and line-to-line
faults, Nikkhajoei and Lasseter propose the use of zero sequence and neg-
ative sequence currents respectively. The presence of unbalanced loading
conditions which are considered when selecting protection settings for relays
within the microgrid is also acknowledged. Essentially, protection settings
should be chosen such that a nuisance trip will not occur during the ex-
tremes of unbalanced loading and a trip should occur for a high impedance
fault within a relay’s zone of protection. The results of the proposed protec-
tion scheme are shown to be very promising in [46]. The main advantage of
a sequence component based protection scheme is the absence of the require-
ment of communications. Time delays are used to ensure selectivity of the
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protection scheme.
The major complications of sequence-based protection are unfounded as-
sumptions regarding the connection of distribution transformers and earthing
points. Australian medium voltage networks are three wire, meaning that
there is no neutral return. Neutral points of the customer are earthed at
each switchboard by the multiple earth neutral system stipulated in AS/NZS
3000:2007 [47]. The connection of transformer windings and EG unit earth-
ing also dictates the flow of zero sequence current which must be taken into
consideration if sequence-based protection is to be implemented in micro-
grids.
5. Conclusion
The protection of DNs with a high EG penetration is a very complex
topic. There are many degrees of entropy including network topology, grid-
connected or autonomous modes of operation, EG size and type, transformer
connections, earthing connection and protective device locations which have
a significant impact on the efficacy of the proposed protection schemes. Fur-
thermore, there is a heightened desire for cost effectiveness for EG proprietors
due to the auxiliary costs of protection and control constituting a much higher
percentage of the overall cost compared with large-scale generation [27].
Protection adequacy in contemporary networks can be achieved through
careful planning and restricting the amount of EG penetration in each feeder.
Safe recloser operation can be achieved through setting reclose attempt du-
rations to greater than two seconds, ensuring all EG is isolated and fault arcs
are extinguished. Coordination of protection devices such as fuses, reclosers
and sectionalisers in a network with a high EG penetration can be achieved
through DN simulation and recalibration of protection settings where neces-
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sary. However, the paradigm of protection adequacy analysis without pre-
cluding EG connection violates the IEEE Standard 1547-2003, suggesting
that current standards are not equipped to handle large EG penetrations.
The formation of such standards is a topic for considerable future research.
Many protection schemes presume the existence of a communications
medium which incurs transmission delays and an increased risk of poor reli-
ability within networks. Further research is necessary to develop and com-
mission a protection scheme that uses communications to improve the speed
and selectivity of the protection response, but does not rely on communi-
cations for execution of the required trip sequence. The protection scheme
must ensure the DN is adequately protected for any mode of operation with
N-1 redundancy including the possibility of communication failure. If an
autonomous network is deemed to be unprotectable, the protection scheme
should isolate all EG units.
There is limited research investigating the probability of protection dis-
crimination and selectivity to be achieved for each proposed protection scheme.
The range of plausible microgrid network topologies renders such an exercise
impractical, particularly when considering highly modular microgrids.
Rather, a protection system capable of dynamically assessing the protec-
tion adequacy of a microgrid with high redundancy is highly desirable. It is
very likely that such a dynamic protection scheme would implement sequence
component and/or distance protection to minimise the number of required
protection and auxiliary devices and provide adequate protection discrimi-
nation without communications. Detection of phase-to-earth faults is highly
dependent on the transformer and earthing connection of the network. A
neutral voltage displacement relay or energy content-based protection are
likely candidates for detecting high impedance faults. Communications can
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be used as a tool to monitor protection adequacy, update protection settings
and reduce tripping time where possible.
For every proposed protection scheme (with the exception of differen-
tial protection which is prohibitively expensive), there exists the possibility
of poor protection discrimination, particularly in networks dominated with
inverter interfaced EG. Many authors tend to suggest complex methods of
fault protection to compensate for the limited fault current capability of mi-
crogrids. However, the stability and fault ride-through requirements of the
microgrid are often ignored or considered separately. The requirement for a
microgrid to contain a heightened thermal inertia to maintain stability and
provide fault ride through in autonomous mode may preclude the antici-
pated low fault current levels of the microgrid to some extent. Conversely,
the characteristics of a microgrid may have to be shaped in order to provide
desirable fault characteristics to reduce the cost and complexity of protection
systems. Hence, a holistic approach towards a microgrid’s robustness dur-
ing fault conditions is necessary in the development of microgrid protection
philosophy.
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7. Appendix
Table 1: Protection Scheme Analysis Table: Grid-Connected EG
Scheme Cost Discrimination/Selectivity Other Notes
Directional OC Comparatively Fault identification not Selectivity issue can be solved
expensive achieved for inverter-interfaced with directional element installed
EG. Selectivity failure possible in upstream OC device.
during reflected faults
OC/Voltage Sag Comparatively Discrimination problems with Only appropriate for cases with
inexpensive long feeders and feeders with one synchronous generator in a
multiple EG. feeder.
Distance Comparatively Fault identification may be Requires a more rigorous study
inexpensive achieved for all EG interface types. for verification. Most likely solution
Requires a detailed off-line study if only locally sourced data is available
to determine protection settings and EG penetration is high.
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Table 2: Protection Scheme Analysis Table: Microgrid Operation
Scheme Cost Discrimination/Selectivity Other Notes
Inertia Wheel Flywheel and No foreseeable problem if flywheel Communication system will be needed
communication is active at the fault instant. as a local flywheel for all EG is
systems both An inter trip system will be needed prohibitively expensive.
expensive for flywheel failure
OC with SC I Comparatively Discrimination problems with A back-up scheme is available
inexpensive inverter-interfaced EG. Poor if communications fail; however,
selectivity during fault clearance. long term selectivity is lost.
OC with SC II More expensive Discrimination problems with Pilot wire is needed.
than OC with inverter-interfaced EG. Short trip
SC I time and high selectivity.
OC with SC III More expensive Discrimination problems with Prohibitively expensive for DNs.
than OC with inverter-interfaced EG. Short trip
SC II time and perfect selectivity.
Current Comparatively Discrimination of HIF requires a Communications can be used to
Sequence inexpensive supplementary control scheme, optimise this scheme but is not
Components otherwise this protection scheme is mandatory.
effective.
Differential Very Discrimination and selectivity is Scheme is prohibitively expensive
expensive always achieved. for DN applications.
VROC Comparatively In general, discrimination and This scheme is only plausible
inexpensive selectivity problems are likely. with very simple microgrid
configurations.
Voltage Comparatively Discrimination capabilities The controller of the inverter
Sequence inexpensive heavily dependent on earthing will also have a significant
Components and transformer connections. impact on efficacy.
Harmonic Comparatively Discrimination capabilities are May be used as back-up protection.
Content inexpensive dubious and are strongly governed
by controllers, filters and load
behaviour.
Travelling Comparatively Discrimination capabilities are May be used as back-up protection.
Waves inexpensive dependent on fault inception
point.
Distance Comparatively Fault identification may be Requires a more rigorous study
inexpensive achieved for all EG interface types. for verification. Most likely solution
Requires a detailed off-line study if only locally sourced data is available
to determine protection settings. and EG penetration is high.
S-Transform Comparatively Fault identification is achieved Back-up protection is needed for
expensive Requires fast and reliable communications failure. A more
communications. detailed study for all EG types
(including storage) is needed.
Differential Comparatively Fault discrimination may be lost Not appropriate in Australia.
Phase Current inexpensive with multiple earthing points.
Hence, applications may not be
effective under some earthing schemes.
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